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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
We address the proper interpretation of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)—specifically, 
whether the conditional nature of an alien’s lawful permanent 
resident status affects his eligibility for a waiver of 
inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  
Under § 212(h)’s aggravated felony bar, “an alien who has 
previously been admitted to the United States as an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” who is later 
convicted of an aggravated felony, is statutorily ineligible for 
a waiver of inadmissibility.  Id.  We must decide whether an 
alien admitted as a lawful permanent resident on a conditional 
basis (“Conditional LPR”) qualifies as “an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence” for purposes of § 212(h).  
 4 
 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) answered that 
question in the affirmative and, therefore, held that Petitioner 
Ka A. Paek was statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver 
because he had committed an aggravated felony after his 
admission as a Conditional LPR.  We agree and will deny the 
petition for review. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Paek is a native and citizen of South Korea.  On June 
5, 1991, Paek was admitted to the United States at a port of 
entry as a Conditional LPR.  The basis for Paek’s admission 
was his mother’s marriage to a U.S. citizen and member of 
the U.S. military, thereby qualifying Paek as an “alien son.”  
See INA § 216(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(h)(2) (“The term 
‘alien son or daughter’ means an alien who obtains the status 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
(whether on a conditional basis or otherwise) by virtue of 
being the son or daughter of an individual through a 
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qualifying marriage.”).  Pursuant to § 216(a)(1), an “alien 
son” “shall be considered, at the time of obtaining the status 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, to have 
obtained such status on a conditional basis subject to the 
provisions of this section.”  INA § 216(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1186a(a)(1). 
On July 5, 2000, after an appropriate petition was 
filed, Paek’s immigration status was adjusted.  See INA 
§ 216(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1) (describing the 
requirements “for the conditional basis . . . for an alien spouse 
or an alien son or daughter to be removed”).  His status was 
adjusted to that of a non-conditional lawful permanent 
resident (“Non-conditional LPR”). 
In 2005 and 2006, Paek was convicted of receiving 
stolen property, theft, and, relevant here, first degree robbery 
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in violation of Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a)(2).1  After 
removal proceedings were initiated against him, Paek applied 
for adjustment of status on the basis of his own marriage to a 
U.S. citizen.  He also sought a waiver of inadmissibility 
pursuant to § 212(h). 
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that, inter 
alia, Paek was statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver 
pursuant to the aggravated felony bar:  
No waiver shall be granted under this 
subsection in the case of an alien who has 
previously been admitted to the United States as 
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence if . . . since the date of such admission  
 
                                              
1 “A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when the 
person commits the crime of robbery in the second degree 
and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of 
immediate flight therefrom, the person or another participant 
in the crime: . . . (2) Displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon or represents by word or conduct that the person is in 
possession or control of a deadly weapon . . . .”  Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 11, § 832(a).  On appeal, Paek does not dispute that 
this offense constitutes an aggravated felony; therefore, we do 
not address that issue. 
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the alien has been convicted of an aggravated 
felony . . . . 
 
INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  The IJ determined that 
Paek’s conviction for first degree robbery was an aggravated 
felony pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F), and that Paek was convicted of this 
aggravated felony after the date he was admitted as a 
Conditional LPR (i.e., after June 5, 1991).  Paek attempted to 
circumvent the aggravated felony bar by arguing that the bar 
does not apply to persons initially admitted as Conditional 
LPRs, but the IJ rejected this argument. 
Paek appealed to the BIA.  “The only issue on appeal 
[was] whether the aggravated felony bar applies to an alien 
who was admitted at a port of entry as a conditional 
permanent resident under section 216(a) of the [INA].”  (App. 
5.)  In a published decision, the BIA determined that the bar 
did apply.  The BIA reached its decision based on the plain 
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language of § 216, but it also relied on a supporting 
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 216.1,2 and a decision of this Court, 
Gallimore v. Attorney General, 619 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  
The BIA’s analysis led it to conclude that Paek is subject to 
the aggravated felony bar and is statutorily ineligible for a 
§ 212(h) waiver.  Paek petitioned for review. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We have jurisdiction over Paek’s question of law.  See 
INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also 
Guzman v. Att’y Gen., 770 F.3d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Our review is limited to constitutional claims and questions 
of law.”).  “We review legal questions de novo, with 
                                              
2 “A conditional permanent resident is an alien who has been 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence within the 
meaning of section 101(a)(20) of the Act, except that a 
conditional permanent resident is also subject to the 
conditions and responsibilities set forth in section 216 or 
216A of the Act, whichever is applicable, and part 216 of this 
chapter. . . . All references within this chapter to lawful 
permanent residents apply equally to conditional permanent 
residents, unless otherwise specified.”  8 C.F.R. § 216.1. 
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appropriate deference for the BIA’s reasonable interpretations 
of statutes it is charged with administering.”  De Leon-Ochoa 
v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Under the 
familiar two-step Chevron inquiry, first, if the statute is clear 
we must give effect to Congress’ unambiguous intent, and, 
second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a 
specific issue, we defer to an implementing agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of that statute.”  Id. (citing Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984)).   
III. DISCUSSION 
Paek urges that, because he was initially admitted as a 
Conditional LPR, he has not “previously been admitted to the 
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”  See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  He 
reasons that the conditional nature of his lawful permanent 
resident status meant that he was not “permanent” when 
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admitted, as required by the statutory definition of “lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence.”  See INA § 101(a)(20), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (“The term ‘lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence’ means the status of having been 
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the 
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”).  
Alternatively, he urges that, if we find the relevant INA 
sections ambiguous, we should remand to the BIA for further 
consideration. 
However, we conclude that the plain language of the 
INA indicates that an alien admitted as a Conditional LPR 
constitutes “an alien who has previously been admitted to the 
United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence,” INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), and, therefore, 
that the BIA correctly determined that the aggravated felony 
bar renders Paek statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver.   
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 “As with any question of statutory interpretation, our 
analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.”  
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009).  “[I]n 
looking for the meaning of this statutory language, we must 
look to the statutory context in which that language is used 
and the broader context of the statute as a whole as well as the 
language itself.”  N.J. Payphone Ass’n v. Town of W. N.Y., 
299 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2002).  “It is true that, in the face 
of statutory ambiguity or uncertainty, we may ‘have recourse 
to the legislative history of the measure and the statements by 
those in charge of it during its consideration by the 
Congress,’” Estate of Arrington v. Michael, 738 F.3d 599, 
605 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Great N. Ry., 
287 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1932)); however, “we do not resort to 
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”  
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994).  Here, 
the statutory text is clear, not ambiguous. 
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The aggravated felony bar provides that a § 212(h) 
waiver is not available to “an alien who has previously been 
admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence if . . . since the date of such admission 
the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony . . . .”  
INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (emphasis added).  We 
have already addressed the proper date on which a 
Conditional LPR, who had the conditional basis of his status 
removed (i.e., who became a Non-conditional LPR), was 
admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.  Gallimore, 619 F.3d at 226-27.3  In 
Gallimore, the Attorney General argued that the alien, Earl 
Gallimore, was not “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence” until the date on which the conditional basis of his 
                                              
3 Gallimore did not turn on the aggravated felony bar; instead, 
the issue was the alien’s eligibility for a discretionary waiver 
of removal under INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), which 
has since been repealed.  619 F.3d at 223. 
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immigration status was removed, as opposed to the date on 
which he became a Conditional LPR.  Id. at 226.  We 
remanded because “the BIA simply overlooked the fact” that 
the date on which Gallimore had become a Conditional LPR 
may have been the relevant date.  Id.  However, in strong and 
persuasive dicta, we noted that the provisions in § 216 
“unambiguously accord conditional LPRs the privilege of 
residing ‘permanently’ in the United States, notwithstanding 
the literal meaning of the word ‘permanently’ and the 
conditional nature of the status.”  Id. at 228.  Furthermore, we 
proclaimed that “[t]he INA thus equates conditional LPRs 
with ‘full-fledged’ LPRs, except to the extent—but only to 
the extent—that [§ 216] prescribes additional obligations.”  
Id. at 229.  While we did opine on this issue, the parties 
before us agree—as do we—that this was dicta and not 
controlling on remand in that case.4 
                                              
4 Paek emphasizes another case, Hanif v. Attorney General, 
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Here, the relevant phrase in the aggravated felony bar 
is defined by statute: “The term ‘lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence’ means the status of having been 
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the 
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the 
immigration laws, such status not having changed.”  INA 
§ 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).  Of course, “[w]hen a 
statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that 
definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary 
meaning.”  Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).  
The thrust of Paek’s argument is that this definition is not 
consistent with Conditional LPR status because, by its very 
                                                                                                     
694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012), but that case is not relevant to 
our holding here.  In Hanif, we determined that, according to 
the aggravated felony bar’s “plain meaning,” the bar did not 
apply to an alien who “originally entered the country 
illegally,” as an illegal alien has not been “admitted” as “an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  Id. at 484. 
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nature, Conditional LPR status is not “permanent” and indeed 
changes. 
However, as we did in Gallimore, we must look to the 
INA as a whole; in particular, we must consider § 216 and 
§ 216A of the INA, which explain the concept of Conditional 
LPR status.  See Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 
217 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that 
‘we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.’” (quoting United States v. Heirs of 
Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850))).  When we consider 
§ 216 and § 216A, we can only conclude that Paek was 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” notwithstanding 
the conditional nature of his LPR status.  
Perhaps most tellingly, § 216 states that “an alien son 
or daughter . . . shall be considered, at the time of obtaining 
the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
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residence, to have obtained such status on a conditional basis 
subject to the provisions of this section.”  INA § 216(a)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also INA § 216A, 
8 U.S.C. § 1186b(a)(1) (“[A]n alien entrepreneur . . . , alien 
spouse, and alien child . . . shall be considered, at the time of 
obtaining the status of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, to have obtained such status on a 
conditional basis . . . .”).  Clearly, Congress contemplated that 
a Conditional LPR “obtain[s] the status of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence,” with the only caveat being 
that said status is obtained “on a conditional basis.”  INA 
§ 216(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1).   
Lest there be any doubt, § 216 and § 216A refer to “the 
second anniversary of the alien’s obtaining the status of 
lawful admission for permanent residence” as being 
synonymous with the second anniversary of the alien’s 
admission as a Conditional LPR.  See, e.g., INA § 216(b)(1), 
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(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1), 
(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A); INA § 216A(b)(1), (c)(2)(A), 
(c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(b)(1), (c)(2)(A), 
(c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A).  For instance, § 216 provides: 
In the case of an alien with permanent resident 
status on a conditional basis under subsection 
(a), if— 
(i) no petition is filed with respect to the 
alien in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (1)(A), or 
(ii) unless there is good cause shown, the 
alien spouse and petitioning spouse fail to 
appear at the interview described in 
paragraph (1)(B), 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
terminate the permanent resident status of the 
alien as of the second anniversary of the alien’s 
lawful admission for permanent residence. 
 
INA § 216(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A) (emphases 
added).  This provision is clearly applicable only “in the case 
of an alien with permanent resident status on a conditional 
basis,” and it provides that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security “shall terminate the permanent resident status of the 
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alien as of the second anniversary of the alien’s lawful 
admission for permanent residence.”  Id.  This means that, if 
no petition to adjust status is filed within two years of an alien 
becoming a Conditional LPR, then the Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall terminate the alien’s “permanent resident 
status” at the conclusion of those two years.  Id.  Surely, a 
Conditional LPR must have had the status of a “permanent 
resident” for two years in order for such status to be 
terminated; otherwise, this provision makes no sense. 
Indeed, the language of § 216 and § 216A repeatedly 
discusses Conditional LPRs having their status of lawful 
admission for permanent residence “terminated.”  See, e.g., 
INA § 216(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1); INA § 216A(b)(1), 
8 U.S.C. § 1186b(b)(1).  If a Conditional LPR did not have 
“the status of lawful admission for permanent residence,” 
then the statutes would not speak of Conditional LPRs having 
such status “terminated.”  See, e.g., INA § 216(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1186a(b)(2) (“Any alien whose permanent resident status is 
terminated under paragraph (1) may request a review of such 
determination in a proceeding to remove the alien.”); INA 
§ 216(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A) (“[T]he Secretary 
of Homeland Security shall terminate the permanent resident 
status of the alien as of the second anniversary of the alien’s 
lawful admission for permanent residence.”); INA 
§ 216(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(B) (“In any removal 
proceeding with respect to an alien whose permanent resident 
status is terminated . . . .”); INA § 216(c)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1186a(c)(3)(C) (“[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security . . . 
shall terminate the permanent resident status of an alien 
spouse or an alien son or daughter . . . .”); INA 
§ 216(c)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(D) (“Any alien whose 
permanent resident status is terminated . . . .”); INA 
§ 216A(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(c)(2)(A) (“[T]he Attorney 
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General shall terminate the permanent resident status of the 
alien . . . .”).   
Similarly, § 216 and § 216A provide that a Conditional 
LPR becomes a Non-conditional LPR by having “the 
conditional basis of such status removed.”  INA 
§ 216(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(2)(A); accord INA 
§ 216A(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(a)(2)(A); see also INA 
§ 216(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1) (“In order for the 
conditional basis . . . to be removed . . . .”); INA 
§ 216(c)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A) (“[T]he alien 
spouse and the petitioning spouse . . . must submit . . . a 
petition which requests the removal of such conditional basis 
. . . .”); INA § 216(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(B) 
(“[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security . . . shall remove the 
conditional basis of the parties effective as of the second 
anniversary of the alien’s obtaining the status of lawful 
admission for permanent residence.”); INA § 216(c)(4), 8 
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U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security 
. . . may remove the conditional basis of the permanent 
resident status for an alien . . . .”).  That Congress spoke of 
the removal of “the conditional basis of such status” 
demonstrates that a Conditional LPR had already obtained the 
status of “lawful admission for permanent residence.” 
Nonetheless, Paek urges that our interpretation of “the 
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” 
is undermined by the fact that § 216(e) singles out 
Conditional LPRs and that this provision would be surplusage 
if all Conditional LPRs are necessarily lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.  Section 216(e) states: 
For purposes of subchapter III of this chapter, in 
the case of an alien who is in the United States 
as a lawful permanent resident on a conditional 
basis under this section, the alien shall be 
considered to have been admitted as an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence and 
to be in the United States as an alien lawfully 
admitted to the United States for permanent 
residence. 
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INA § 216(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(e).  Subchapter III relates to 
naturalization, and it does not include § 212(h), which is in 
subchapter II.  Paek argues that, if a Conditional LPR is “an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” Congress 
would not need to state that Conditional LPRs are 
“considered” to be lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, nor would it have limited § 216(e) to apply only to 
“subchapter III.” 
The canon against surplusage counsels us to “give[] 
effect to every word” of a statute and to avoid rendering a 
statute “superfluous,” whether in whole or in part.  Marx v. 
Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1177 (2013).  But we 
read § 216(e) not as limiting the situation in which 
Conditional LPRs are the same as Non-conditional LPRs, but 
rather as clarifying that, for purposes of naturalization, it does 
not matter whether an alien is a Conditional LPR or a Non-
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conditional LPR: either way, the naturalization provisions 
apply.  We believe that Congress desired to clarify that, for 
naturalization purposes, a Conditional LPR does not need to 
wait for the removal of the conditional basis of his status 
before seeking naturalization, and does indeed have the status 
of “an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  In 
light of all the other passages in § 216 and § 216A cited 
above, we do not believe that this instance of purported 
surplusage creates any ambiguity as to Congress’s intent for 
the aggravated felony bar.5 
                                              
5 We also reject Paek’s invocation of the rule of lenity.  See 
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997) (“The rule 
[of lenity] does not apply when a statute is unambiguous or 
when invoked to engraft an illogical requirement to its text.”).  
Likewise to no avail is Paek’s reliance on the canon that, 
where “Congress includes particular language in one section 
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it 
is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States 
v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).  The 
fact that Congress did not repeat the cumbersome phrase 
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Paek urges that certain legislative history, which refers 
to Conditional LPR as being a “status” or as otherwise being 
different from Non-conditional LPR, indicates that our 
conclusion is incorrect.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-906, at 7 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5979 (“Creates 
a two-year ‘conditional’ status for all alien spouses, sons, and 
daughters who become permanent resident aliens . . . .”); id. 
at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5981 (“By postponing 
the privilege of permanent resident status until two years after 
the alien’s obtaining the status of lawful admission for 
permanent residence, the bill provides a balanced 
approach.”).  But, given the clarity and lack of ambiguity in 
the statutory text, Paek’s cited legislative history is 
unavailing.  See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 147-48.  Regardless, 
                                                                                                     
“whether on a conditional basis or otherwise” as a modifier 
for “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” in every 
instance, as it did in § 216(h)(1) and (h)(2), does not create an 
ambiguity in the statute.  
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Paek can point to nothing in the legislative history that 
indicates that Congress intended the aggravated felony bar to 
be inapplicable to Conditional LPRs.  Whether the legislative 
history refers to Conditional LPR as a separate status or 
otherwise contrasts Conditional LPR from Non-conditional 
LPR status is of no moment.  Simply put, for purposes of the 
aggravated felony bar, a Conditional LPR is to be treated the 
same as a Non-conditional LPR. 
Given that we find no ambiguity in the statute, we 
decide this case at step one of the Chevron analysis.  We do 
not address the issues the parties have raised in connection 
with Chevron’s step two, which involve the amount of 
deference we should afford to the BIA’s published decision in 
this case.  However, we remind the BIA that “agencies should 
not move away from their previous rulings without cogent 
explanation.”  Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 
2006).  In two prior unpublished BIA decisions, the BIA held 
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that the aggravated felony bar does not apply to an alien 
admitted as a Conditional LPR.  See, e.g., In re Mata-Rosas, 
No. A076-404-712, at 3 (BIA Apr. 20, 2011) (concluding 
that, because “the respondent was lawfully admitted as a 
conditional lawful permanent resident,” the aggravated felony 
bar is inapplicable); In re Peretz, No. A29-832-294, at 4 (BIA 
May 25, 1999) (“Furthermore, assuming that the respondent 
remained a conditional resident, we do not agree that this 
constitutes the functional equivalent of legal permanent 
residency for purposes of applying for section 212(h) 
relief.”).  The BIA’s published decision in Paek’s case 
contradicted these two prior rulings, without acknowledging 
the contradiction.  Perhaps our decision in Gallimore is the 
reason for the BIA’s change in position, as the BIA cited 
Gallimore in its decision.  If so, it is understandable why the 
BIA mistakenly believed that Gallimore compelled the result.   
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Regardless, issues concerning the amount of deference 
owed to the BIA’s decision are irrelevant to our determination 
of whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous.  We 
need not decide what level or type of deference we would 
give to the BIA’s decision in Paek’s case because we 
conclude that our inquiry ends at step one of the Chevron 
analysis: the statutory language of the INA unambiguously 
provides that an alien admitted as a Conditional LPR is 
subject to the aggravated felony bar. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
